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Policemen in the Dock:
Criminal Prosecution of Police Personnel in Wilhelmine Prussia
I. Introduction
In September 1902, the Prussian Justice Minister Karl Heinrich Schönstedt sent a request to
all  senior  prosecutors  (Oberstaatsanwälte)  asking them how many police  employees  had
been prosecuted and convicted at the criminal courts (Landgerichte) for violence and illegal
arrests.  The  request  included  all  types  of  police  personnel:  full-time  personnel  from the
Schutzmannschaft,  the  Gendarmerie and  municipal  police  forces,  as  well  as  part-time
personnel (night watchmen,  Hilfspolizei,  Polizeidiener). The figures resulting from this and
similar  requests  in subsequent  years are astonishing:  556 prosecutions  between 1899 and
1905, leading to 400 convictions, just for acts of violence and illegal arrests. These figures
are high, not only compared to Victorian/Edwardian Britain and the French Third Republic,1
but also by 21st century standards.2 
The high rates of prosecutions of police personnel happened despite police having
clear interests in avoiding trial in open court, with judges overwhelmingly accepting police
explanations as well as repeated attempts by successive interior ministers to publicly deny
problems  of  police  violence  and  malpractice.3 Historians  and contemporary  observers  of
Wilhelmine  Prussia  have mainly  focused the fact  that  the vast  majority  of  allegations  of
police violence were rejected by the prosecuting authorities, interpreting this as evidence of
the particularly elite  driven and authoritarian nature of the Prussian-German system. Yet,
similar interests and dynamics have characterised the prosecution of police personnel in most
Western societies  from the 19th to the 21st centuries.  As police managers generally  prefer
dealing with incidents of excessive violence and other forms of police malpractice through
internal  disciplinary  procedures,  most  Western  police  forces  have  developed  a  range  of
mechanisms to minimise the number of criminal prosecutions against police personnel.4 The
true significance of the Prussian case is therefore the comparatively high rates of prosecution
and conviction. 
The multiple cases of prosecution against police personnel cannot be seen simply as a
reflection of the amount and severity of violence generated by the Prussian police. French
policing was equally characterised by extreme levels of random violence, yet in France there
is only one known case between 1880 and 1914 of criminal prosecution against French police
personnel  for  acts  related  to  their  professional  conduct.5 Similarly,  despite  the  English
rhetoric about the ‘gentle London Bobby’, the cases of police violence brought before the Old
  My warm thanks to Klaus Weinhauer, Karl Härter, Herbert Reinke and Murray Frame for their constructive
criticism and helpful suggestions in the development of this article.
1 Johansen (forthcoming)
2 The annual number between 2006 and 2012 of prosecutions against German police personnel for violence with
bodily harm was around 30. (Amnesty International (2010) pp.19-20; Singelnstein (2013) pp.15-27). Yet, this is
still  considerably higher than the figures for France in the 1990s (Jobard, 2002, p.257; Fassin, 2011, ch.4).
Although, figures for 21st century the US and UK are patchy and hard to verify, they are lower than the Prussian
figures  when the  number of  police  personnel  are  taken  into account.  For the USA, see  data  by Henry  A.
Wallace’s ‘Police Crime Database’  https://policecrime.bgsu.edu/Home/Crimes; Stinson (2017); Stinson et al.
(2016).  See  also  Walker  & Archbold  (2014)  p.50.  For the  UK see  IPCC, Annual  Reports  2007-2017 and
‘Misconduct Sanctions Imposed on Officers’ (2002-2009) https://www.ipcc.gov.uk.  
3 Johansen (2011) pp.59-83.
4 Harris (2012) pp.323-332;  Lee  et al.  (2013) pp.386-401;  Walker (2003);  Klockars et  al.  (2005).  See also
Johansen (2016a). 
5 For a detailed analysis of the French case, see Johansen (forthcoming)
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Bailey – as well as the many incidents reported in the British press which never reached the
courts – were as nasty as the ones appearing before the Prussian Landgerichte.6 
That police personnel in Wilhelmine Prussia were very frequently involved in court
proceedings,  both as defendants and plaintiffs,  is well  known.7 Yet it sit  awkwardly with
existing scholarly interpretations about police accountability and the nature of Wilhelmine
Prussia  as  a  political  regime.  While  much  historical  research  since  the  1990s  has
fundamentally  challenged  the  Sonderweg interpretation  with  its  depiction  of  Wilhelmine
Prussia as stuck in its absolutist pre-modern legacies,8 interpretations of police accountability
are still strongly influenced by the seminal works research of the 1970s and 1980s, despite
current recognition of the ambiguities and significant aspects of ‘modernity’ of Wilhelmine
Prussia.9 
The high number of prosecutions of Prussian police personnel call for a rethink of the
correlation that some historians10 and police scholars11 have drawn between democratisation
of  political  regimes  as  strengthening  levels  of  police  accountability  to  the  public:  while
Prussian courts prosecuted and convicted police personnel throughout the nineteenth century,
the  fully  democratic  French  Third  Republic  was  extremely  reluctant  to  allow  criminal
prosecution against policemen.12 This is particularly important in the light of current public
concerns  about  lack  police  accountability  in  the  21st century,  with  academic  research
revealing  the  limitations  around  citizens’  access  to  justice  in  contemporary  Western
democracies.13 
This article has three main aims. In the first place, it establishes as much evidence as
possible about the cases that led to prosecution, the police officers who were prosecuted and
convicted,  as  well  as  the  punishments  issued.  Throughout  the  article,  evidence  from
contemporary  France  and  Britain  is  included  in  order  to  provide  much  needed
contextualisation of key aspects of the Prussian case.  Unfortunately, the patchy and uneven
documentation in all three countries does not allow for systematic comparison. Most of the
British evidence relates to evidence from London, while the French evidence covers all police
forces as well as the gendarmerie.
6 The cases documented by James Timewell in multiple pamphlets and by the former police magistrate, Hugh
Gamon,  testify  to the extensive violence committed by London policemen out of the sight of ‘respectable’
citizens. See Gamon (1907) and in particular Emsley (1985); ibid. (2005) Chap. 8; ibid. (2010) pp.145-53. 
7 Hall  (1977,  p.98),  Jessen  (1991,  pp.165  &  182)  and  Spencer  (1992,  pp.1057)  all  recognise  criminal
prosecution of police personnel as a common phenomenon in Prussia, but only touch upon this in passing.  Hall
also mentions that the Social Democratic daily  Vorwärts recorded 131 cases in 1898 alone involving police
personnel  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants.  Lüdtke  (1982,  pp.18490)  analyses  one  single  case  from  1845-6  to
demonstrate how leniently State authorities handled incidents excessive police violence. Lindenberger  (2011,
pp.20613) analyses of the court procedures to obtain compensation for a victim of police violence, but with no
discussion of possible criminal prosecution of the responsible policeman. Only Funk (1986, pp.969 & 1012)
provides some brief descriptions of the key features of criminal prosecution as part of a wider complex of police
accountability by the mid-nineteenth century.
8 The main champion of this interpretation remains Hans-Ulrich Wehler (1973). For a critical analysis of the
Sonderweg thesis, see Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn (1984).  
9 Lüdtke (1982);  Funk (1986) pp.2869;  Reinke (1991);  for  more recent  reflections  of  this  perspective see
Lindenberger (2011) and Haupt (2012).  
10 Hsi-Huey Liang (1992) p.4 was the first to explicitly formulate this connection. For a critical perspective see
Johansen (2016b).
11 For sociologist  and political  scientists  working on 21st century  policing,  the assumption of a  correlation
between democratic political institutions and high levels of police accountability forms the basis for the concept
of ‘democratic policing’: Waddington (1999) pp.21-27; Bayley (2006); Manning (2010); Reiner (2010) pp.7 &
88-9. For critical perspectives on ‘democratic policing’ see Bittner (1970) and Brodeur (2010) pp.115 & 135-6.
12 Johansen (forthcoming).
13 Walker (2005); Smith (2004) pp.1533. See also Johansen (2014); Aden (2016) pp.1533.
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 The second aim is to examine the dynamics around the criminal justice process, as
well  as  the  institutional  and  cultural  context  in  which  Prussian  prosecutors  and  judges
operated. The article identifies the options available to members of the judiciary as well as
their  level  of  independence  from  interference  from  police  managers  and  government
authorities.  It  analyses  how they negotiated  the perennial  dilemmas  of enforcing the law
under the pressure from public opinion, at a time when attitudes towards police violence were
rapidly changing. By the turn of the 20th century authorities  in Prussia,  as in many other
European  countries,  were  confronted  with  rising  public  expectations  to  responsive  and
accountable governance, with prosecution of police violence and illegality being a major area
of contention.
The third  aim is  to  explore  the  wider  implication  of  these  court  decisions  in  the
context of public concerns about police malpractice and the pressure from the left-liberal and
social democratic opposition for greater police accountability to the law. The sustained, and
often highly effective, attacks from the liberal left and the social democratic press on the
foundations of the Prussian state, combined with an increasing number of highly damaging
scandals have led historians to describe the Wilhelmine era as beset by ‘crises of legitimacy’
(Legitimationskrise), which affected both the police and the criminal justice system.14 This
opens for new question why the comparatively high rates of prosecution of Prussian police
personnel did not lead to a strengthening of the public trust in the criminal justice system as
guaranteeing police accountability.  
II. ‘Blind in the right eye’? Interpretations of the Prussian judiciary
The Prussian  judiciary  has  gone down in  history  with a  very  poor  reputation  for  highly
politicised professional  conduct.  After the collapse of the 1848 Revolutions,  the criminal
justice  system was characterised  by a  consistent  tension between reluctant  acceptance  of
certain liberal principles, notably on issues of legal boundaries around state officials15, and
persistent  government  attempts  under  Bismarck  to  use  the  criminal  justice  system  to
implement regime conserving policies. Nevertheless, by the Wilhelmine era the rule of law
(Rechtsstaat) had come to constitute the cornerstone in legitimizing the regime and became
the foundation for all  interaction between State and citizens.16 As a result,  Prussia of the
Wilhelmine era developed into a highly litigious society in which the letter of the law and
sense of justice (Rechtsbewusstsein) were routinely invoked in the public discourse and in
citizens’ challenges to public authorities.17
Social  Democrats  and  left-leaning  police  critics  repeatedly  alleged  that  police
personnel were protected by their superiors and by the Prussian judiciary. At the same time
they complained that procedures and court decisions were systematically biased against the
plaintiffs,  particularly  if  they  belonged  to  the  lower  orders  of  society  (known  as
Klassenjustiz) or were known or suspected supporters of the social democratic movement.18
Such  complaints  were  justified  in  the  light  of  the  absurd  discrepancies  between  the
14 For the police, the idea of a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ has been particularly promoted by Ralph Jessen (1991)
p.180. See also Funk (1986) pp.286ff.  On the ‘crisis of legitimacy’ of the criminal justice system see Hett
(2004), Domeier (2010) ch. 5; Grunwald (2012) [for the Weimar era]. 
15 Stolleis (2001) pp.3745.
16 Geheimes Staatsarchiv (hereafter GStA), HA1, Rep. 84a, No, 2685 ‘Die gerichtliche Verfolgung der Beamten
wegen  Überschreitungen  ihrer  Amtsbefugnisse,  Art.  97.  der   Verfassungsurkunde  vom  31  Jan.  1850’,
(Document 131): Vossische Zeitung, 2 Sept. 1874. See also Funk (1986). 
17 Hett (2004); Goldberg (2010).
18 Aulus Agerius (1896); Rechtsschutzverein (1898) pp.i-iv; Beradt (1909); Block (1911); Frohme (1926); . See
also Hall (1977) and Johnson (1995) 40-42. 
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punishments  handed  down  to  left-wing  political  critics  for  rather  innocuous  public
statements, compared to the punishments given to police personnel for violence causing death
or serious bodily harm. This criticism intensified during the early Weimar years, with Emil
Julius  Gumbel’s  famous  statistical  studies  of  political  violence  between  1918  and  1922,
which revealed systematic discrepancies between the harsh punishments handed down for
political  violence  committed  by  the  political  left  and the  leniency  or  non-prosecution  of
political  violence  by  far-right  extremists.19 The  negative  interpretation  of  the  German
judiciary was further exacerbated by the appalling travesties of the German justice system
during the Nazi era. The collusion of important sections of the German judiciary with the
Nazi regime made a mockery of the German legal tradition, which has weighed heavily on
historical interpretations, and raised questions about the cultural and professional outlook of
the Prussian judiciary during the Kaiserreich.20
Over the past fifteen years, however, historians have sought to challenge the negative
perspective  on  the  Prussian  judiciary  of  the  Wilhelmine  era  as  shaped  by  their  social
background and professional socialisation.21 Instead recent research on the German judiciary
of the Imperial era focus on what happened in the courtrooms rather than analysing the social
and professional background of its personnel. This has led to descriptions of a more modern
and independent professional body, far from simply the agency of government policies or a
prelude  to  the  juridical  horrors  of  the  Third  Reich.22 Hett  in  particular  emphasises  the
progress  in  legal  protection  and flexibilities  within  the  system which  allowed  increasing
leniency and recognition of individual circumstances behind criminal behaviour. According
to Hett, this pattern continued until the end of the Weimar era.
The findings of this research place a different perspective on the criticism from left-
liberals  and social  democrats  who complained that  punishments  against  erring policemen
were far too soft. Comparing the punishments for police violence with the harsh sentences
handed down to left-wing political  activists  and striking workers,  they called  for tougher
sentences for police violence.23 Yet, it were the harsh sentences of left-wing activists – rather
than the sentencing of the police personnel – that were out of line with general sentencing
practices. Indeed, the acts of prosecutors and judges toward erring policemen were highly
ambiguous.  Although  members  of  the  Prussian  judiciary  were  unyielding  loyalty  to  the
regime and strongly tended to give accused policemen any benefit of the doubt, they were
also concerned about upholding the authority of the criminal justice system, and therefore did
not shelter police personnel at all costs. Indeed, the sentences they handed down to convicted
policemen were not out of line with punishments issued to civilians for violence offences or
with sentencing practices against London police personnel. In a broader perspective these
findings  therefore  raise  questions  about  for  the  link  that  historians  have  drawn between
prosecution practices against police personnel during the Wilhelmine era and the travesties of
justice committed by members of the Prussian judiciary during the Weimar Republic and the
Nazi dictatorship. 
19 Gumbel (1921); id. (1922); Kuhn (1983).  
20 This  criticism  was  first  developed  during  the  1960s,  particularly  in  Heinrich  Hannover  and  Elisabeth
Hannover-Drück (1966), and continues to shape interpretations of the Prussian-German judiciary between 1918
and 1945. See in particular Jarausch (1985) pp.37998; id. (1990). See also discussion by Stolleis and Simon
(1981) pp.1351. For a recent critical assessment of the literature drawing connections between the conservatism
of the judiciary of the Imperial Era and the complicity of the German judiciary in Nazi misuse of justice see
Grunwald (2012) pp.28.
21 Siegrist (1996); Ledford (1996). 
22 Hett (2004); Goldberg (2010); Grunwald (2012).
23 Frohme (1926) pp.1834; Exner (1931); Rabl (1936). 
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III. Public debates on police brutality and the organisation of support for victims
The 1890s marked a fundamental shift in the dynamics between police authorities and their
social  democratic  and  left-liberal  critics,  who  managed  to  place  police  and  government
authorities increasingly on the defensive. With the liberalisation of press censorship and the
rise of a mass press, police misconduct came to occupy a very prominent place in the public
debate of the 1890s, in which critics consistently expressed frustration that police frequently
got  away with very serious  violence  and even manslaughter.24 The public  concern  about
police brutality and the difficulties for victims to challenge police malpractice led to several
attempts to form support organisation. For this purpose, a group of lawyers and journalists
around Gustav Kauffmann organised the ‘Association for Legal Protection and Reform of the
Criminal  Justice  System’  (Verein  für  Rechtsschutz  und Justizreform)  in  1882.  The group
claimed to be inspired by Rudof von Jhering’s influential 1874 pamphlet ‘The Struggle for
Law’,  and by the  spring  of  1883 the  organisation  had 600 members.25 Nevertheless,  the
initiative was rather short-lived with no mentioning after 1886. In 1895, a series of highly
publicised  incidents  of police  brutality  led to  the formation  in Hamburg of  the so-called
‘Association for the Protection against Policemen’ (Verein zum Schutz gegen Schutzleute),
later known as the Rechtsschutzverein. Because it was based in the free-city of Hamburg, and
did not need authorisation from the Prussian Interior Ministry, this organisation existed at
least until 1906, but had few members and limited influence. Like the group around Gustav
Kauffmann in the early 1880s, the Rechtsschutzverein was committed to lobbying for greater
legal protection against police brutality, and to inform citizens about their rights in relation to
the  police. Accordingly,  several  pamphlets  provided  information  about  how to  complain
against  the  police  according  to  the  procedures  prescribed  by  the  1883  Law  on  Local
Administration (Landesverwaltungsgesetz), and advice about the legal position of citizens in
relation to the police.26 In addition, with the non-renewal of the anti-Socialist legislation in
1890,  the  social  democratic  movement  began  to  organised  legal  advice  bureaus
(Rechtshilfestellen) in some of the major cities, where workers could obtain affordable legal
advice for all types of problems with employers or with public authorities27. Although many
of the legal advice bureaus in smaller locations had to be abandoned due to lack of qualified
volunteers, the Social Democratic criticism was central to the complaints culture against the
police that developed during the Wilhelmine era.
By the turn of the 20th century the public criticism of police malpractice cut across the
political spectrum and included the ‘conservative’ press, which was otherwise unyieldingly
loyal to the existing social and political order. This culminated in 1902-3 with a series of
debates in the Prussian House of Representatives and the Reichstag about police violence and
malpractice  under  the slogan ‘Protection against  Policemen’  (Schutz  gegen Schutzleute).28
Successive interior ministers appeared in the Prussian Diet to publically refute the existence
of any problem. Yet, the internal ministerial correspondence reflects increasing unease within
government  about  the  continuous  popular  outrage  and  its  potential  impact  on  police
24 Königsberger  Volkszeitung,  19 Juni  1902 ‘Danzig:  ein Polizeikommissar  als  Angeklagter’: GStA,  HA1,
Rep.77, CB S, No. 519, ‘Beleidigungen verübt durch Beamte, Offiziere. 1895-1913’, doc. 54. 
25 Trescher (1883) pp.163-167. 
26 Kamptz (1894); Anon. [Rechtsschutzverein] (1898).  
27 GStA, HA1, Rep. 77, CB S, 400 ‘Rechtshilfe für Sozialdemokraten, 1895-1914’. 
28 Debates in the Prussian House of Representatives 17 Feb. 1898 (Session 24) and 17 Feb. 1899 (Session 22)
on  police  approach  to  the  population;  Debate  in  the  Reichstag 22  Nov.  1902  (Session  220)  concerning
mistreatment of Polish workers by the police. Debates in the House of Representatives  5 Feb. 1903 (Session
14); 31 January 1908 (Session 21); and 23 Feb. 1910 (Session 23) on police mistreatment of civilians; Debate in
the  Reichstag 11 Mar. 1910 (Sessions 54-55) as well as four debates in the  Reichstag 9-14 December 1910
relating to the recent Moabit Riots. 
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legitimacy  –  particularly  in  the  pro-government  press.29 Nevertheless,  the  public  outrage
about  police  violence  preoccupied  the  public  discourse  even  before  the  most  notorious
scandals of the Wilhelmine era.30
These concerns were understandable given that the left-liberal and social democratic
press used police violence to attack the legitimacy, not just of policing, but of the political
regime, which was accused of condoning and encouraging random violence against innocent
members of the public. The critical press repeatedly ran lengthy reports on extreme police
violence that either went unpunished or led to what police critics described as ridiculously
lenient  sentences.  These  were  juxtaposed  to  great  effect  with  examples  of  very  harsh
sentencing against striking workers or social democratic newspaper editors convicted of libel
against  public  servants.31 At the same time,  the frequent prosecutions  of police personnel
were  presented  as  evidence  of  the  Prussian  police  being  prone  to  extreme violence  and
generally out of control. This politicisation of police violence was the background against
which  Justice  Minister  Schönstedt  began  to  collect  information  about  prosecution  cases
against police personnel.32 
IV. Prussian Rates of Prosecution in Context
Prosecution of police personnel was nothing new in the 1890s. Throughout the second half of
the 19th century, there was a steady stream of prosecutions and convictions against police
personnel Sometimes the plaintiff was a member of the public, but often prosecution was
initiated by the police itself, with several high profile cases.33 In 1883, Gustav Kauffmann
organised  a  petition  to  the  Prussia  House of  Representatives  complaining  about  the  near
impossibility for aggrieved citizens to take action against violent police personnel.34 Despite
these  genuine  difficulties,  out  of  the  seventeen  cases  mentioned  in  the  Petition  –  which
covered a period of 24 months from 1881 to 1883 – ten cases led to criminal prosecution and
conviction, three were still pending, and only four led to no trial.  In at least one case the
offending  Schutzmann was dismissed from the police.  In addition to the prosecutions for
violence, police personnel were also frequently involved in libel cases,35 although most often
policemen  appeared  in  court  as  plaintiffs,  suing  anyone  who criticised  their  professional
conduct.36 Thus,  both the civil  and criminal  courts  played a key role in  settling  conflicts
29 Letter from Chancellor Bülow to the Prussian Justice Minister, 10 Dec. 1902: GStA, HA1, Rep.77, Titel 345,
17/1, docs. 289-293. 
30 The homosexual scandals around Fritz Krupp and Phillip Eulenburg erupted respectively in 1903 and 1907
(See Domeier, 2010), while the scandals relating to genocide and later sexual misconduct in German colonies
only started in 1904 (see Habermas, 2016).   
31  See for instance the highly publicised case against Polizeisergeant Wilhelm Lorenz in Stettin. Vorwärts 26
Sept.  1896 and  Vorwärts Berlin,  30 Sept.  1896: GStA,  HA1,  Rep.  77,  CB S,  572 ‚Begnadigungsrecht  der
deutschen Landesherren, 1896-1918’. 
32 Justice  Minister  to  senior  prosecutors  at  the  Landgerichte,  13 Sept.  1902:  GStA,  HA1,  Rep.  84a,  8264
‘Justitzministerium: Verbrechen und Vergehen im Amte, 1872-1934’, vol. 5, doc.116.
33 LABB,  A.  Pr.  Br.  30,  Berlin  C,  Titel  93:  Personnel  files.  These  contain  many  references  to  criminal
prosecution of Berlin police personnel from 1815 onwards. The high profile cases include the prosecutions in
the 1840s and 1860-1861 against Wilhelm Stieber, the head of the detective squad; the case against the detective
Hugo von Schwerin 1881-1882; the 1894 case against Eugen von Tausch, detective from the political police.
34 The Kaufmann Petition to the lower house of the Prussian Diet, Nov. 1883: GStA, HA1, Rep. 77, Titel 345,
no.17, vol.1, ‘Das gegen pflichtvergessene Polizeibeamte zu beobachtende Verfahren und deren Entlassung aus
dem Dienste (Übergriffe der Polizeibeamten) 1814-1903’, docs. 8493. 
35 GStA, HA1, Rep.77, CB S, 519, ‚Beleidigungen verübt durch Beamte, Offiziere, usw. 1895-1913’; See also
Goldberg (2010). 
36 GStA, HA1, Rep. 77, CB S, 497,  ‘Prozesse, Beleidigung von Behörden und Beamten, 1895-1912’. 
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between police and public. Yet, while the rates of prosecution in Prussia were high compared
to  other  countries,  these  cases  only  constituted  a  very  small  proportion  of  the  criminal
allegations made against police personnel. Taking a policeman to court was a lengthy and
extremely cumbersome process, with very limited prospects of success. 
Table 1: Annual number of convictions and acquittals of Prussian police personnel37
Number of
cases
Convictions Acquittals Conviction Rates
1899 68 41 27 60.3
1900 98 74 24 75.5
1901 97 76 21 78.4
1902 89 69 20 77.5
1903 98 66 32 67.3
1904 53 35 18 66.1
1905 53 39 14 73.6
In total 556 400 156 71.2
The 556 cases established by the Justice Ministry do not include all  prosecutions against
police personnel as these figures only relate to transgressions of the articles 339-343 of the
Penal Code.38 With the exception of a handful of less serious allegations,  all  the cases in
Schönstedt’s documents were tried at  the provincial  criminal courts (Landgerichte) or the
three Berlin Kammergerichte – rather than the lower courts (Amtsgerichte). The most severe
cases were tried before a jury (Schöffengericht or Schwurgericht).39
Although comprehensive figures are not available for Britain, it is possible to make
broad estimates for London that contextualises the Prussian figures. This study has identified
sixteen  cases  at  the  Old  Bailey  over  a  twenty-nine  year  period  between  1884 and 1913
involving twenty-five members of the London Metropolitan police.40 These cases cover all
37 GStA, HA1, Rep.84a, microfiche 6740, ‚Justizministerium, Verbrechen und Vergehen im Amte, 1872-1934’
vol. 5; GStA, HA1, Rep.84a, microfiche 6746, ‘Justizministerium, Zusammenstellungen und Nachweisungen
über Verurteilungen, Freisprechungen bzw. Begnadigungen von Polizeibeamten wegen Überschreitung ihrer
Amtsbefügnisse, 1896-1906’.
38 Schönstedt’s request only concerned violations of the paragraphs 339-343 of the Penal Code. These are the
paragraphs which concern misuse of power by officials (art. 339); grievous bodily harm (art. 340); illegal arrest
(art. 341); unlawful entry into private property (art. 342); and pressuring suspects into confession (art. 343). The
figures therefore do not include prosecutions of policemen for offenses such as perjury or corruption, although
we know from press reports that several cases on these offenses were also tried in Prussian courts; nor do they 
Include libel cases, which constituted by far the greatest proposition of prosecutions against police personnel.
39 According to Spencer (1992, p.106) 16 out of 29 convictions handed down by the Düsseldorf courts in 1892-3
were for violence with bodily harm.
40 t18840107-165 against PC Friedrich Whisker for perjury (not guilty); 
t18841020-986 against PC Charles Hall for perjury (guilty - 18 months hard labour); 
t18850518-376 against PC Michael Kavanagh for perjury (not guilty); 
t18850727-766 against PC George Tubman; PC Wharf Fuller; PC Samuel Bennett; PC Thomas Fuller; Henry
Griggs for unlawful assault (not guilty); 
t18860111-237 against PC Alexander Austin for wounding (not guilty); 
t18871024-1058 against PC Bowden Endacott for perjury (not guilty); 
t18880702-700 against PC George Russell for perjury (not guilty); 
t18960420-403 against PC John Parslow for perjury (not guilty); 
t18961116-39 against PC Thomas Murray for perjury (guilty - 9 months hard labour); 
t18980110-112 against  PC John Ferris; PC Frederick Corps; PC Richard Sands; PC Charles Woodridge for
assault on George Hillman (not guilty); 
t19020909-657 against PC William Rolls for perjury (guilty); 
t19030112-8 against PC Charles Thwaites for mail theft (guilty - 18 months hard labour); 
t19040321-329 against PC Alfred Williams for perjury (not guilty); 
t19071119-42 against PC James Adams for perjury (not guilty); 
t19081020-49 against PC Edwin Ashford for wounding (guilty 9 months hard labour); 
7
types of offences. The numbers seem in line with the assertion by the ‘Royal Inquiry into the
Duties of the Metropolitan Police’ (1909) that there were no prosecutions of police personnel
at the Old Bailey in 1906. That year, four police officers appeared before a magistrates’ court
for assault, but these cases were all dismissed by the magistrate.41 There seems to have been,
on average, less than one prosecution per year at the Old Bailey.  In comparison, the Berlin
Kammergerichte prosecuted at least 52 cases between 1895 and 1906, which amounts to an
average of 4.3 per year.42 This was despite the London Metropolitan police being more than
twice the size of the Berlin Schutzmannschaft.43 The conviction rate at the Old Bailey of 37.5
percent  was also considerably  lower than the conviction  rate  of  81 percent  for  the cases
appearing  at  the  Berlin  Kammergerichte.  At  the  same  time,  it  was  quite  common  for
aggrieved Londoners to use the magistrates’ courts to bring cases on lesser charges against
Metropolitan  police  personnel.  While  this  would  most  often  lead  only  to  money
compensation for damage of property and personal injury it allowed the aggrieved individual
to get some official recognition of victimhood. According to the Royal Inquiry of 1909, eight
Metropolitan policemen appeared before a London magistrate in 1908, but only on charges of
misdemeanours.44 
A much starker pattern of police unaccountability emerges in France, where criminal
prosecution  of police  personnel  or  gendarmes was  exceedingly  rare,  despite  considerable
pressure from the highly influential and well-connected League of Human Rights (Ligue des
droits  de  l’homme),  which  systematically  pressured  for  greater  accountability  from  its
inception  in  1898.  In  all  France,  only  one  single  case  of  criminal  prosecution  has  been
identified between 1890 and 1914 for acts relating to the professional functions, in the 1903
Forissier Affair. In addition, there is one known case was a civil suit brought against three
policemen in Lyon in 1904. So while the French press was teeming with allegations about
extreme police violence and widespread perjury, criminal prosecution almost never happened
as police managers and prosecution authorities went to great lengths to prevent this.45  
V. The twisted road to criminal prosecution: An elimination process in four stages.
The cases appearing in Prussian courts show a consistent pattern, which involved a series of
stages  before  prosecution  of  a  policeman  was  considered  at  all.  The  vast  majority  of
allegations of violence were rejected outright on the grounds that the alleged police acts –
although technically illegal – fell into one of the categories that would exempt the policeman
from criminal responsibility: notably, acts committed under order as part of a broader police
operation.  Prosecution further hinged on the complete innocence of the alleged victim. In
most of the cases for which we have details, the complainant was first accused of resisting
arrest or of violence against the police, and had to prove their innocence with the burden of
evidence heavily stacked against them.46 Many criminal allegations of police violence and
illegal arrest were preceded by a separate prosecution against the complainant. 
t19130204-64 against PC Albert Brooks; PC Maurice Wetherill; PC William Smithe for assault and perjury
(guilty - Brooks 4 months hard labour, Wetherill and Smithe each 12 months hard labour). 
41 ‘Report of the Royal Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police’ (London, 1909). Parliamentary
Papers Cd 4261, vol. III ‘Minutes and Evidence; Appendices and Index’, 116.
42 Jessen (1991) p.367 (Table 15).
43  The number of uniformed and plain clothes police officers within the London Metropolitan Police increased
from 14,000 in 1889 to 21,000 in 1914, while the number of Schutzmänner for Berlin and suburbs (Groß-Berlin)
was just under 9,000 by 1910. Shpayer-Makov (2011) p.60; Jessen (1991) p.359. 
44 ‘Report  of  the  Royal  Commission  upon the  Duties  of  the  Metropolitan Police’,  London,  HMSO,  1908.
Parliamentary Papers Cd 4261, vol. III ‘Minutes and Evidence; Appendices and Index’, 116.
45 For details on the French case, see Johansen (forthcoming). 
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As long as the police provided accounts that were logically consistent – no matter
how unbelievable – the complainant was most likely to be convicted with no possibility of
raising a case against the police. From the cases reported in the press, a consistent pattern
appears whereby courts acquitted alleged victims of police violence only when it became
clear during the trial that police witnesses had knowingly not told the truth. Yet, unlike in
France, where the best victims of police violence could hope for was acquittal from charges
of resisting arrest and violence against the police,47 in Prussia acquittal of the complainant
opened the possibility for making a counter-accusation against the policemen. The charge
that would subsequently be raised against the policemen tended to be for violence or illegal
arrest, rather than perjury. 
For a complaint against a policeman to be accepted, the alleged victim had to be able
to demonstrate a blameless past. Any previous history of arrest or being known to the police,
or just being suspected of social democratic sympathies – no matter how unrelated to the
events  under  consideration  –  was  repeatedly  used  as  sufficient  grounds  for  the  court  to
declare that violent acts  by the police were justified as legitimate law enforcement.  Only
complainants  with  blameless  previous  conduct  and  unyielding  loyalty  to  the  monarch
(Kaisertreue) would have a chance of getting their day in court. Given the hoops that the
complainants had to get through in order for the policeman to enter the dock, it is hardly
surprising that only a tiny proportion of criminal allegations led to a trial. The vast majority
of  cases  were  rejected  by  the  public  prosecutor,  who  at  every  stage  accepted  fanciful
explanations  by  the  accused  policeman  and  other  police  witnesses,  often  in  stark
contradiction to the testimonies of independent witnesses. 
At the trial, much of the case would revolve around whether the accused policeman
had caused actual harm. This could cover a variety of damages, some of which were easy to
establish,  such  as  attack  on  the  complainant’s  rights  and  freedom through  illegal  arrest.
Others could be more difficult to prove: whether bodily harm was caused by the policeman,
or whether it was self-inflicted or due to an accident, as police often maintained. If actual
harm was established in court, the accused policeman might still get off the hook if he could
make a convincing case of acting in good faith: mistaking the victim for a ‘known criminal’,
or arguing that the alleged victim acted suspiciously, or – what was accepted in some cases –
the policeman claiming to have acted in good faith, but on the basis of incorrect interpretation
of the law. 
The  cases  which  passed  successfully  through  all  stages  therefore  tended  to  be
straightforward and often rather extreme, where the evidence against the accused policeman
was  overwhelming,  and  where  mitigating  circumstances  were  difficult  to  establish.  The
public debate about police violence and malpractice was in a permanent stalemate between,
on the one hand, critical journalists, public commentators and lawyers acting on behalf of
aggrieved citizens who referred to the letter of the Penal Code and what they saw as plain
‘sense of justice’ (Rechtsbewusstsein). On the other hand, the prosecution ruled according to
highly restrictive definitions of what constituted criminal acts for policemen in action. 
VI. The role of the public prosecutor and the judiciary
46 See newspaper reports: GStA, HA1, Rep.77, CB S, No 48 vols. 1, 3 and 4 ’Angriffe gegen Behörden, 1896-
1898; 1906-1918’. Similar observations were made by Agerius (1896) p.23. See also Johnson (1995) p.43.
47 Johansen (forthcoming).
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Due to the monopoly of state prosecution for most offenses, the Prussian public prosecutor
played a central  role in accepting or rejecting cases against the police.48 Nevertheless, the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877 allowed individuals to bring criminal charges on their
own initiative and expenses (Privatklage),  but only after a case had been rejected by the
public prosecutor49 and only for two specific types of offences. One was libel which led to a
tsunami of civil suits between police personnel and individual citizens during the Wilhelmine
era.50 The other offense was violence with bodily harm.51 Between the 1880s and the turn of
the  century  an  important  shift  took  place,  moving  away  from  predominantly  private
prosecutions. A significant number of the trials mentioned in the 1883 ‘Kauffmann Petition’
were private prosecutions52, while by the years 1899-1905, all but a handful of cases were
prosecuted  by  the  Staatsanwaltschaft.  The  transition  towards  public  prosecution  had
important consequences, as it enabled more people without means to get their day in court. 
Critical contemporary observers and historians have tended to presume that the social
and professional background of prosecutors and judges of the Wilhelmine era determined not
only their political outlook but also their professional decisions towards whatever was in the
interest of the Prussian state. There can be no doubt that both prosecutors and judges were
unfailingly loyal and committed to support the interests of the Prussian state and to uphold
the existing political and social order. Yet, this does not mean that their decisions in relation
to  accused  police  personnel  were  entirely  predictable.53 Moreover,  given  that  the  cases
against police personnel are distributed across many Prussian  Landgerichte and involved a
considerable number of prosecutors and judges, decisions to prosecute and convict were not
restricted to a few unconventional or maverick members of the judiciary. 
The Prussian judiciary were dependent on the state due to their status as civil servants,
and as such potentially vulnerable to government pressure,54 it is important also to emphasise
the  extensive  levels  of  independence  enjoyed  by  Prussian  prosecutors  and  judges  from
interference  from government  and police  authorities.  While  the  entry  to  the  professional
positions as judges and prosecutors was highly selective with only the most loyal candidates
being  appointed,55 they  were  appointed  for  life  and  could  only  be  removed  through
disciplinary procedures conducted by their peers. The minister of justice, as their immediate
superior, had no influence on judicial decisions as the ministerial oversight only concerned
administrative matters.56 So if Bismarck in the 1880s still insisted on their right to override
legal boundaries in the name of governmental supremacy, no evidence has been found for the
Wilhelmine era of interference from the Prussian Justice Ministry in cases against  police
personnel.57 In comparison, the members of the French judiciary were far more vulnerable to
48 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz of 1877, section 148.
49 Strafprozessordnung, 1877, sections 170-3; Strafprozessordnung articles 377 and 417; See also Brettschneider
(1909); Mayr (1927); See also Goldberg (2010) p.30. 
50 Goldberg (2010); GStA, HA1, Rep.77, CB S, no.519 ‚Beleidigungen verübt durch Beamte, Offiziere, usw.
1895-1913’.  In 1903 province governor of the Düsseldorf province even encouraged police personnel to sue
citizens for libel as one way of asserting the authority of the police (Spencer (1992) p.107).  
51 Terfloth (1918) pp.1112.
52 Newspaper cutting from Berliner Zeitung, 16 May 1884: GStA, HA1, Rep. 77, Titel 345, 17/1, ‘Das gegen
pflichtvergessene Polizeibeamte zu beobachtende Verfahren und deren Entlassung aus dem Dienste (Übergriffe
der Polizeibeamten) 1814-1903’, doc. 82; The Kaufmann Petition 1883: Ibid. (docs. 84-93). 
53 Grunwald (2012) p.9.
54 Ledford (1996) pp.36. On contemporary questioning of the independence of judges, see Hett (2014) p.31.
55 Carsten & Rautenberg (2015) pp.1245; Wilke (2016) pp.1315.  
56 Wilford Garner (1903), p.514.
57 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz 1877. The legislation of the reform era that sought to draw institutional separations
between the judiciary and the administration (which included the police). Lüdtke (1982) p.56.
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change in the political constellations, notably regime change, with several rounds of purges
as a defining collective experience throughout the 19th century.58 
Furthermore, Prussian prosecutors also seemed to operate without much reference to
the police authorities. Police scholars have pointed out that, in general, public prosecutors
tend  to  avoid  conflicts  with  police  authorities  over  malpractice  because  they  need  good
working relationships with the police in order to function effectively.59 It is therefore worth
noting that Prussian prosecutors and judges displayed great assertiveness in relation to the
police authorities, including the powerful police president of Berlin. In one communication
with the police, the most senior public prosecutor (Oberstaatsanwalt) informed the Berlin
Police President about evidence of widespread malpractice within the political police, relating
to investigation of a controversial police detective.60 In a tone that is unusually blunt for the
otherwise  highly  formalistic  and  overly  polite  Prussian  bureaucratic  style,  the
Oberstaatsanwalt requested the police president to look further into the functioning of this
unit.  In  comparison,  successive  Parisian  procureurs almost  never  sought  to  challenge
successive police prefects who categorically objected to prosecution of their personnel and
never challenged the tacit covenant between police and the state that police were never to
face criminal prosecution for acts committed in the service of the French state.61
Generally, the levels of compartimentalisation between the judicial authorities and the
police were much higher in Prussia compared to France. Indeed, there is very little evidence
of  inter-institutional  communication  over  cases  against  Prussian  police  personnel.
Complainants raised their cases directly with the public prosecutor, who was under obligation
to investigate all allegations of criminal transgression. This process did not involve the police
authorities  at  all.62 In  France,  by  contrast,  there  was  close  and  ongoing  communication
between police and prosecutor.  In Paris bureaucratic  practices had developed whereby all
allegations  of  criminal  behaviour  against  police  personnel  were  forwarded  by the  public
prosecutor to the Paris police prefect. The allegations were then handed over for investigation
by  the  internal  disciplinary  unit,  le  contrôle  général.  By  this  administrative  procedure,
criminal  allegations  were  effectively  redefined  as  disciplinary  matters,  and  thereby
conveniently removed from the courts.63 While in France, any attempt to prosecute police
personnel would constitute  a major breach with established practice,  Prussian prosecutors
operated within a system that had strong precedents for criminal prosecution of civil servants,
including police personnel. 
Prussian prosecutors had good reasons for bringing charges against erring policeman
in serious cases to prevent the victim from launching a private prosecution – an option which
was not open to complainants within the French system. In the 1870s several elements were
introduced to Prussian criminal justice procedures inspired by the English legal tradition.64
These  included  independent  lawyers  (Rechtsanwälte)  who  could  act  as  defence  or  as
prosecutors in private prosecutions. These independent lawyers were outside the control of
58 For comparative a perspective with France see Wilford Garner (1903) pp.513-14 & 516; Similarly, Hellwig
(2015) p.263. 
59 Klockars (1985); Sherman (1985); Punch (2003) pp.171-196; Walker & Archbold (2014) p.50.
60 Letter from Senior Prosecutor for  Landgericht I, Berlin to Police president von Windheim, 27 Mar. 1895:
GStA, HA1, Rep 84a, 58195, ‘Untersuchungssache gegen Kommissar von Tausch’, docs.3844.
61 Johansen (forthcoming) 
62 Raymond Fosdick (1969, p.16), in his famous 1911 investigation of European police organisations, claimed
that in continental European police systems police had a say in whether or not prosecution could go ahead.
While this was de facto the case for France, this study has been unable to find any evidence of this in relation to
Prussian prosecutions.  
63 Johansen (forthcoming).
64 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz of  1877;  Strafprozeβordnung of  1877,  Rechtsanwaltsordnung of  1878/79.  See
Stolleis (2001) pp.377-9.
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the  state-employed  judiciary,  and  could  cause  considerable  embarrassment  to  public
authorities.  This  was  repeatedly  evidenced  during  trials  against  social  democrats  where
defence lawyers turned the court room into a politicised platform, denouncing the biases and
injustices within the criminal justice system. The decision by public prosecutors to go ahead
with some of the most clear-cut cases was undoubtedly influenced by the greater control they
could then exercise over the process in potentially damaging trials.
As public opinion acquired an increasing role in court cases during the Wilhelmine
era, prosecutors and judges – although not directly accountable to the citizenry – could not
entirely ignore that their decisions were reported in the critical left-wing press as ‘evidence’
of the systematic  bias  of the criminal  justice system against  victims of police  violence.65
Alongside  debates  about  policemen’s  attitude  towards  the  public  ran  another  debate
lambasting  the  judiciary  for  class  bias  and  political  obstruction  of  critical  voices.66 The
Prussian judiciary therefore  had good reasons to share the concerns expressed within the
police and the Interior Ministry about maintaining loyalty among the core supporters of the
regime.  While  prosecutors  and judges  may not  have felt  much sympathy for  workers  or
members of marginal groups, many of the victims of police brutality were well-established
middle-class citizens who could not be described as anything but upright supporters of the
regime. In such cases the interest of the state was to avoid antagonising the victim and get a
bad press in the conservative newspapers. 
Judges and prosecutors were under consistent scrutiny from the critical press – left-
liberal or social democratic – who would seize any opportunity, not only to attack the police,
but to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the courts, and ultimately of the political
regime. Thus, public prosecutors and judges operated within a highly politicised context, and
the individual judge could not ignore the potential damage to the prestige of the courts and
the  political  regime  from  systematically  exonerating  extremely  violent  acts  by  police
personnel.  Moreover,  prosecutors  and judges  needed to be concerned with upholding the
legitimacy of the criminal justice procedures, as well as the reputation of public servants as
incorruptible.67 Evidence  of  policemen  blatantly  lying  under  oath  undermined  trust  and
respect of their own profession by making a mockery of the judicial process, even among the
loyal sections of the population.68 
The  critical  left-leaning and social  democratic  press  often  gained the moral  high-
ground in the propaganda war. Some of the reporting style, particularly of the 1890s, was
highly emotive and outraged. However, increasingly critical journalists restricted themselves
to simply reporting the facts of the case – often carefully selected and ordered for maximum
effect – whereby the court rulings came to appear completely at odds with the ‘facts’ of the
case. The Prussian judiciary,  on their side, were struggling to maintain a public image of
impartiality  in  cases  against  police  personnel.  So despite  applying considerable  obstacles
against alleged victim of police malpractice, they were also eager to demonstrate that they
were holding erring policemen accountable to the Penal Code. Yet, prosecuting some of the
most  extreme cases  – while  many others  went  unpunished – did nothing to  improve the
public  trust  in  the  impartiality  of  the  criminal  justice  system.  While  the  high  rates  of
prosecution should have demonstrated the robustness of police accountability to the law, this
was overshadowed by repeated public outcries over outrageous incidents of police violence
65  Hett (2004) epilogue; Agerius (1896); Beradt (1909).
66  For example, the analysis by Hans Block after the so-called Moabit riots in Sept. 1910: Block (1911).
67 Fricke (1912, pp.12-3) talks about the principle of ‘purity in the exercise of public office’  (Reinheit  der
Amtsausübung). 
68 GStA,  HA1,  Rep.  77,  CB  S,  83  vol.  1  ‚Gerichtsentscheidung  und  deren  Kritik,  1895-1908’;  vol.  2,
‘Gerichtsentscheidung und deren Kritik, 1909-1918’. See also Spencer (1992) pp.1028 on police discipline and
expectations to conduct.
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that  went  unpunished.  As  a  result,  the  Prussian  judiciary  of  the  Wilhelmine  era  got  a
reputation for undue leniency towards violent police personnel, crassly contrasted with the
heavy sentences issued to political critics of the regime. This reputation was only exacerbated
during the Weimar era by the unbalanced prosecution of violence by Communist activists
compared  to  violence  by  far-right  extremists,  and  later  destroyed  altogether  when  many
members of the German legal profession colluded with the Nazi regime.
VII. The Policemen on Trial: Regional Distribution and Rank
So who were the policemen on trial? Unsurprisingly, the largest number of trials come from
the  industrialised  and  highly  urbanised  western  regions  of  the  Rhineland  (Cologne)  and
Westphalia (Hamm, which included the Ruhr area), as well as the mining areas of Silesia
(Breslau).69 The Berlin region comes in fourth place (52 trials out of 556 or 9.4 per cent),
while the remaining nine Oberlandesgericht regions account for an average of 4.2 per cent of
the  trials.  The majority  of  criminal  prosecutions  appear  in  areas  which  were  policed  by
municipal forces rather than the state organised  Schutzmannschaft. Accordingly, municipal
police personnel constituted the overwhelming and increasing majority of the accused.70 
The availability of records of 417 convicted policemen who applied for reduction of
their sentence (Gnadensuche) between 1895 and 1906 give some important insights about the
profile  of the policemen who were convicted at  the Prussian courts.71 Unsurprisingly,  the
majority of those who applied for reduction in their sentence belonged to the lower ranks,
which constituted the most numerous personnel groups within the police, and also those who
were  in  direct  everyday  contact  with  the  population.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  the
applicants were – or had been – full-time police employees either in one of the municipal
police  forces,  the  Schutzmannschaft or  the  gendarmerie.  Only  about  one  in  eight  of  the
Gnadensuche (53 out of 417) came from the part-time supporting personnel (Polizeidiener,
Nachtwächter and Hilfspolizei), although they often had the most difficult tasks, patrolling at
odd hours during the night, and due to their low status often struggling to assert personal
authority, respect and cooperation among the population.72
A disproportionately high number of applications for sentence reduction came from
middle-ranking  police  personnel  in  commanding  positions  (police  sergeants,  police
lieutenants  and  Wachtmeister),  despite  constituting  a  minority  among  the  overall  police
personnel.73 There  may  be  two  explanations  for  this,  which  are  not  mutually  exclusive.
Personnel at this level were likely to be more resourceful than the rank-and-file and therefore
more likely to apply for reduction of their sentence. At the same time, if several policemen
69 GStA, HA1, 84a, 8265, ‘Nachweisung der im Jahre 1899-1905 erfolgenden Verurteilungen und Freispruche
von Polizeibeamten wegen Überschreitung ihrer Amtsbefugnisse’.  See also the calculations by Jessen (1991)
Table 15a. On the inadequate police numbers in rapidly developing industrial areas see also Evans (1991) p.172.
70 According to Jessen’s calculations, the municipal police, with 17,090 men, and the Schutzmannschaft, with
16,801  by  1913  accounted  for  almost  equal  proportions  among  Prussian  police  personnel:  43.1  per  cent
municipal police; 42.4 per cent Schutzmannschaft, while 14.5 per cent of the Prussian police force belonged to
the gendarmerie. However, the proportion of applicants from municipal forces increased from 66.7 to 83.3 per
cent  between 1896 and 1905, while  the proportion of  applications from members  of the  Schutzmannschaft
declined from 33.3 to 16.7 per cent. Jessen (1991) Tables 6 and 15b. 
71 GStA, HA1, Rep.84a, microfiche 6744 ‘Justizministerium, ‚Zusammenstellungen und Nachweisungen über
Verurteilungen,  Freisprechungen  bzw.  Begnadigungen  von  Polizeibeamten  wegen  Überschreitung  ihrer
Amtsbefügnisse, 1896-1906’.
72 Jessen (1991) pp.6970 & 1823. 
73 GStA, HA1, Rep.84a, microfiche 6744 ‘Justizministerium, ‚Zusammenstellungen und Nachweisungen über
Verurteilungen,  Freisprechungen  bzw.  Begnadigungen  von  Polizeibeamten  wegen  Überschreitung  ihrer
Amtsbefügnisse, 1896-1906’. 
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were accused, the most senior officers generally received harsher punishments. This seems to
indicate that the prosecution and judges were particularly severe on those at higher ranks,
expecting  them to be role  models for their  subordinate  personnel  and therefore clamping
down  more  severely  on  professional  transgressions.  The  majority  of  convicted  police
personnel  went  back  to  their  former  post  after  conviction,  often  in  their  former  rank.
However,  a  non-negligible  number  of  those  applying  for  reduction  in  their  sentence  are
registered  as  ‘former’  –  whether  sacked or  having left  by their  own decision.  While  the
practice  of  retaining  police  personnel  after  a  criminal  conviction  was criticised  in  public
debates, by the 1890s it was also being challenged from within the system.74  
VIII. Sentencing practices
The records from the Prussian Justice Ministry also provide an overview of the sentencing
practices in cases against police personnel between 1899 and 1905. Although, the Penal Code
and the Code of Criminal Procedure defined in detail the sentences for individual offenses,
Prussian  judges  still  had  a  significant  margin  of  discretion  between  the  maximum  or
minimum sentences. In just over half of these cases (209) the policeman was fined, while the
rest (191) were given prison sentences, for the major part of 3-6 months (86 cases). In 27
cases the convicted police officers were given sentences of 6 months to a year, while 12 were
sentenced to prison terms of more than a year, and 5 were given the most severe punishment,
Zuchthaus with hard labour. 

















1899 - - - 1 10 7 23
1900 1 - 3 2 20 12 36
1901 2 2 2 7 17 16 30
1902 2 - 1 7 17 7 35
1903 - - 2 6 11 11 36
1904 - - 1 2 6 4 22

















Police  critics  frequently  derided  the  sentences  handed  down  to  police  personnel  as
ridiculously  lenient,76 while  police  managers  argued that  police  were particularly  harshly
74 GStA, HA1, Rep. 77, CB S, 83/1 ‚Gerichtsentscheidung und deren Kritik, 1895-1908’, doc. 5.
75 The figures for punishment provided by the Justice Ministry add up to 401. This inaccuracy most likely came
about because one convicted policeman was given more than one type of punishment. ‘Zusammenstellung der
im Jahr 1905 anfolgten Verurtheilungen und Freigespüche von Polizeibeamter wegen Überschreitungen ihrer
Amtsbefugnisse  (§§  339-343)’:  GStA,  HA1,  Rep.  84a,  microfiche  6746 ‘Justizministerium,
Zusammenstellungen  und  Nachweisungen  über  Verurteilungen,  Freisprechungen  bzw.  Begnadigungen  von
Polizeibeamten wegen Überschreitung ihrer Amtsbefügnisse, 1896-1906’, docs. 177179. 
76 Ostsee-Zeitung, 9 Oct. 1907, ‘Bestrafung von Beamten in der Theorie und in der Praxis’: GStA, HA1, Rep.
84a, microfiche 6741, ‘Justitsministerium’: Verbrechen und Vergehen im Amte, 1872-1934’, doc. 158. Agerius
(1896) pp.236; Anon. [Rechtsschutzverein] (1898) pp.i-iv.
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punished for breaking their  professional  duties.77 Whether  the sentences  were appropriate
remains a normative question. Yet, two studies by the Austrian criminologist Franz Exner
and  his  pupil  Rupert  Rabl  on  general  sentencing  practices  from  1880  to  1930  help  to
contextualise the sentences issued to police personnel during the Wilhelmine era.78 
Police and non-police  offenders were convicted  according to different  paragraphs:
Article 340 (relating to police personnel) and articles 223 and 228 (relating to non-police
defendants).  The prescribed punishment for policemen convicted for article 340 ‘Grievous
bodily harm in the exercise of duty’  (Körperverletzung im Amt)  varied between one day
minimum and six months prison as maximum, or a fine. In serious cases, policemen were
prosecuted  both according to  article  340 and article  223. The latter  paragraph concerned
dangerous bodily harm in general, and could be applied to civilians and police alike.79 The
prescribed punishment for article 223 started with two months prison and could go up to five
years.  This  however  could  be  reduced  down  to  one  day  depending  on  mitigating
circumstances. The prosecution of police personnel according to article 223 allowed judges
the  discretion  to  apply  considerable  longer  jail  sentences  to  police  personnel  than  those
defined by article 340. 
Exner and Rabl both observe that punishments for all types of offences became more
lenient  between the 1890s and 1930.80 This  trend was constant,  irrespective of the major
social and political upheavals from the Wilhelmine era through the First World War to the
Weimar Republic and included major revisions of the Penal Code:81 Prison sentences tended
to become shorter and an increasing number of offences were punished only by fines.82 This
suggests that the punishments issued to police personnel between 1896 and 1905 were part of
a long-term trend towards more lenient sentences for violence. No similar tendency towards
lenient sentencing applied to cases against political opponents of the regime.83 Thus, rather
than seeing the sentencing of police personnel as simply due to preferential treatment, it was
part of a broader trend. In contrast, the sentencing of political opponents of the regime and
activists from the political left was disproportionate already in the 1890s. Over time, as the
practice  of  issuing  harsh  sentences  to  critics  of  the  political  regime  remained  largely
unchanged, it became increasingly out of line with sentencing for other offences.
During the years 1899-1905 the proportion of policemen who were given only fines
for violations of Articles 339-343 was 52.3 percent84. Exner shows that by 1925-1927, 89.5
percent of violations of Article 340 (the paragraph that specifically related to police violence)
led  to  fines  only.85 In  comparison,  the proportion  of  cases  of  violence  with  bodily harm
committed by civilians that led only to a fine increased from 41 percent for the period 1890 to
77 Grotefend (1888) p.11; Segger (1898) pp.3840; Beyendorff (1900) p.67; Eiben (1903), p.viii; Priester (1904)
pp.10-1; Lemke (1904) pp.207-11; Bartels (1913) pp.10-4. 
78 Exner (1931); Rabl (1936). 
79  Art. 340 „Körperverletzung im Amt - 1 Tag bis 6 Monate Gefängnis oder Geldstrafe“. Art. 223 Gefärliche
Körperverletzung – 2 Monate bis 5 Jahre, bei mildere Umstände 1 Tag bis 3 Jahre Gefängnis oder Geldstrafe‘.
80 A similar point was made by Ludwig Mayer (1928) pp.1-2 & 20-5, and by Hett (2004) pp.187-189 for the
Wilhelmine era.  
81 Exner (1931) pp.1723. 
82 Exner (1931) p.19; Rabl (1936) pp.17-8.
83 The sentences meted out for political murder by far-left militants as documented by Gumbel in  Vier Jahre
politischer Mord, similarly point towards these being extreme compared to the general patter in sentencing as
described by Exner and Rabl.
84 GStA, HA1, Rep. 84a, 8264, ‘Justizministerium: Verbrechen und Vergehen im Amte, 1872-1934’ (vol.5);
GStA,  HA1,  Rep.  84a,  8265,  ‘Justizministerium:  Zusammenstellungen  und  Nachweisungen  über
Verurteilungen,  Freisprechungen  bzw.  Begnadigungen  von  Polizeibeamten  wegen  Überschreitung  ihrer
Amtsbefügnisse, 1896-1906’.
85 Exner (1931) p.117.
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1903 to 66 percent in 1911 and 66.8 percent in 1925-1927.86 Looking specifically at fines
together  with the sentences of imprisonment  of less than three months,  a pattern appears
whereby  sentencing  of  both  civilians  and  police  moved  towards  lighter  punishments  for
violence with bodily harm: Between 1890 and 1903 the percentage for civilians given fines or
shorter prison sentences was 83 percent. By 1925-1927 this had increased to 88 percent for
civilians, while it was 93 percent for policemen convicted according to art. 340. Thus the
long-term  trend  is  clearly  towards  more  fines  for  violence  with  bodily  harm,  whether
committed by police or by civilians.
Comparison  of  Prussian  sentencing  practices  with  those  in  London  needs  to  be
approached with caution due to the low number of convictions of police at the Old Bailey.
Nevertheless, the data from London do not indicate greater leniency by the Prussian courts
compared to the Old Bailey. Firstly, in London the conviction rate for cases against police
personnel  was  much  lower  than  at  Prussian  courts.  Secondly,  the  sentences  fall  broadly
within the same range as in Prussia: out of a total of 19 prosecutions against London police
personnel, 13 concerned perjury, which led to six convictions with sentences ranging from
three months’ prison to 18 months’ hard labour.87 The seven prosecutions of wounding or
assault  only led to two convictions.  In 1908 PC Ashford was convicted for a very nasty
assault on George Gamble, a young worker from Southwark who suffered serious injuries in
the course of the beating. Ashford was sentenced to nine months hard labour.88 In 1913 three
police constables, Albert Brooks, Maurice Wetherill and William Smithe were convicted at
the Old Bailey for assault and perjury. Brooks was given four months hard labour, while
Wetherill and Smithe were each given twelve months hard labour.89 Despite difficulties in
comparing  these  patterns,  it  shows that  the  sentences  given to  Prussian  police  personnel
between 1895 and 1906 fall broadly within the same range as the punishments handed down
to convicted policemen at the Old Bailey. 
IX. Systemic Undermining of Court Sentencing.
There was, however, one aspect of the Prussian criminal justice system – completely out of
the control of the judges – which undermined the punishments issued by them, namely the
access of convicted individuals to apply to the king for a reduction in the sentence handed
down by the courts (Gnadensuche). This was a legacy of the pre-constitutional powers of
German sovereigns, which controversially continued to operate at the margins of the criminal
justice system until 1918.90 Between 1898 and 1908, the number of applications sent to the
Justice Ministry and presented to the king with a ministerial recommendation increased by
450 percent.91 Application for sentence reduction was by no means the preserve of public
servants, as even common criminals sought – and frequently obtained – significant reductions
in their sentences.92 
86 Exner (1931) pp.22 & 112.
87 oldbaileyonline: t18710918-671 against PC George Jacobs for Perjury (three months’ prison) 
oldbaileyonline: t18761120-48 against PC William Bailey for perjury (recommended mercy) 
oldbaileyonline: t18841020-986 against PC Charles Hall for perjury (eighteen months’ hard labour);
oldbaileyonline: t18961116-39 against PC Thomas Murray for perjury (nine months’ hard labour); 
oldbaileyonline: t19020909-657 against PC William Rolls for perjury (no sentence stated). 
oldbaileyonline: t19130204-64 against PC Albert Brooks; PC Maurice Wetherill; PC William Smithe for assault
and perjury (Brooks got four months’ hard labour, Wetherill and Smithe got each twelve months’ hard labour). 
88 oldbaileyonline, t19081020-49. 
89 oldbaileyonline: t19130204-64.
90 Kesper-Biermann (2012) pp.21-47.
91 From 6,000 applications in 1898 to 28,000 in 1908. Kesper-Biermann (2012) p.34.
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The vast majority of the  Gnadensuche came from policemen convicted for violence
and grievous bodily harm, and would therefore be included in the list of trials and convictions
established for 1899-1905. Although the two lists are not easily comparable it appears that a
high proportion of those convicted of violence and grievous bodily harm (between 56 and 83
percent depending on the year) applied for sentence reduction. Unfortunately the documents
do not indicate exactly how large a proportion of these applications were accepted, but for the
majority of cases the decision is indicated in the margins, which shows that the success rate
was  above  50  percent.93 The  reduction  in  sentences  could  be  substantial: Fines  were
frequently reduced to less than half of the original sum, and prison sentences were similarly
reduced by half, even for very serious violence. In one case, a Wachtmeister and a clerk, who
had caused grievous bodily harm to a young apprentice arrested on suspicion of theft, got
their original two sentences substantially reduced. The  Wachtmeister’s original sentence of
one  year  of  hard  labour  was  reduced  to  six  months  of  confinement  in  a  fortress
(Festungshaft),  which  was  the  most  lenient  and  least  degrading  form  of  confinement
available.  The  clerk  had  his  sentence  reduced  from  six  months  prison  to  three  months
Festungshaft. 
The applications  – which were most commonly formulated by the defence lawyer
appointed by the court94 – give some clues about what the Justice Ministry was likely to
accept  as  mitigating  circumstances.  The  applications  stress  the  good  character  of  the
convicted policeman, claiming that the act of violence was out of character and in contrast to
his previously unblemished professional service. Emphasis is also placed on the pressure the
policeman  was  under  when  committing  the  act  of  violence.  Similarly  revealing  are
expressions,  which repeatedly appear in these appeals,  describing convicted policemen as
“having forgotten his duties” (Pflichtvergessende) or showing “exaggerated zeal in doing his
duty” (übertriebenem Pflichteifer). It implies that the convicted policemen had transgressed
the boundaries of their  office out of the right professional motives.  The fact that a large
proportion of these applications were accepted indicates that the Justice Ministry and the king
accepted these as valid reasons for overriding the decision by the courts. The reductions in
sentencing bear no relation to the minimum sentences defined by the Penal Code, and thereby
undermined the authority of the law. So while the punishments handed down by the judges
were  only  slightly  lighter  than  general  sentencing  practice  for  violence  by  civilians,  the
access to  Gnadensuche completely undermined the decisions made in court. The outcome
was often very lenient punishments – and this was of course what was subsequently reported
in the critical press. 
X. Conclusions
Although Prussian prosecution of police personnel was patchy and inconsistent, with only a
tiny minority of alleged criminal acts ever reaching the courts, the Prussian courts played a
greater role in keeping police to account than the criminal justice systems in the French Third
Republic or even in Victorian/Edwardian London. The sentences against  police personnel
92 Vorwärts,  1  Dec.  1896,  ‘Begnadigungen’  and  Vorwärts,  25  Dec.  1898,  ‘Einige  bemerkenswerte
Begnadigungen aus dem Jahre  1898’:  GStA, HA1,  Rep. 77, CB S, 572, ‘Begnadigungsrecht  der  deutschen
Landesherre, 1896-1918’ (no document number).
93 GStA, HA1, Rep.84a, microfiche 6744 ‘Justizministerium, ‚Zusammenstellungen und Nachweisungen über
Verurteilungen,  Freisprechungen  bzw.  Begnadigungen  von  Polizeibeamten  wegen  Überschreitung  ihrer
Amtsbefügnisse, 1896-1906’.
94 Vorwärts Berlin,  30  Sept.  1896,  ‘Der  Schutzmann  Lorenz’:  GStA,  HA1,  Rep.  77,  CB  S,  572,
‘Begnadigungsrecht der deutschen Landesherre, 1896-1918’, (no document number).  The original applications
are not available, only snippets cited on the government lists. 
17
issued by Prussian courts were only slightly more lenient – and generally falling within the
same range – as the punishments issued against police personnel by judges at the Old Bailey
in London. The tendency during the Wilhelmine era towards increasingly lenient sentences
for police violence must also be understood as part a broader trend towards lighter sentences
for  most  offences.  Rather,  it  was  the  harsh  punishments  handed  down  to  critics  of  the
Prussian regime that were out of line with prevailing sentencing practice. These findings call
for  reconsideration  of  interpretations  describing  the  decisions  of  Prussian  judges  as
systematically  lenient  towards  police  personnel,  at  all  costs.  The  professional  actions  of
Prussian prosecutors and judges cannot be predicted on the basis of their social background
or  professional  socialisation.  Compared  to  their  French  counterparts,  their  willingness  to
prosecute and convict police personnel also reflects their greater independence from police
and  government  interference.  Moreover,  although  Prussian  prosecutors  and  judges
undoubtedly tended towards political conservatism and unfailing loyalty towards the State,
their  decisions were also influenced by concerns about upholding respect for the criminal
justice process in the face of extreme cases of police malpractice.
While police and government authorities in London also went to great lengths to deny
and cover up police malpractice – as evidence of illegality and violence would undermine the
legitimacy  of  the  police  –  London  police  personnel  were  occasionally  prosecuted  and
convicted. Importantly, when criminal prosecution became inevitable in the face of mounting
evidence,  the  case  was  presented  to  the  British  public  as  exceptional  and  isolated.
Accordingly, trials against London police personnel were turned into a public demonstration
of the effectiveness of the courts in keeping a few ‘rotten apples’ accountable to the law. As a
result, the criminal prosecution of police personnel in London could help to strengthen public
trust in the well-functioning of existing accountability mechanisms. In Prussia, by contrast,
the willingness of the criminal justice system to prosecute the most extreme cases of police
malpractice did nothing to improve public trust in the criminal justice system. Instead, it was
the multiple cases of horrific police brutality that went unpunished, which caught the public’s
attention. This gave the critical press excellent opportunities to attack the legitimacy, not just
of the police but of the political regime, and they did their best to fuel the public indignation.
Their criticism was so successful that trust in the judicial processes to keep police to account
was seriously undermined, even among those who were otherwise loyal to the regime and
tended to support  robust  public  order  policies.  Repeated  attempts  by Prussian police  and
government authorities to improve police-public relations always fell short of the goals set by
the critical press, which held up British policing as the gold-standard – without any regard to
the fact that, in Britain, these standards were often not met, either by the police or by the
criminal justice system. In comparison, the Prussian courts were in fact not doing that badly. 
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